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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
By RANDY DEDDENS*
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky Supreme Court and the Kentucky Court of
Appeals rendered decisions of notable significance in the area
of search and seizure during the 1979-80 survey period. This
article is devoted to a discussion and evaluation of recent
cases involving three types of arguably permissible warrant-
less searches: searches incident to a lawful arrest, automobile
impoundment and inventory searches, and investigatory auto-
mobile searches.
I. SCOPE OF SEARCH INCIDENT TO AN ARREST
Kentucky courts recently decided two cases which at-
tempt to' define, within the ambiguous terms of Chimel v. Cal-
ifornia,1 the scope of a constitutionally permissible warrant-
less search of a premises as incident to a lawful arrest.2 In
Collins v. Commonwealth,3 the Kentucky Supreme Court up-
held as incident to an arrest, and within the Chimel guide-
lines, the search of an air conditioner which was located four
to seven feet from where the defendant was seated following
his arrest in a motel room. On the other hand, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals declared in Taylor v. Commonwealth4 that
the warrantless search of the basement of the defendant's
* J.D. 1980, University of Kentucky. The author appreciates the assistance of
Professor William H. Fortune in the preparation of this article.
395 U.S. 752 (1969). Chimel is generally regarded as the leading case concern-
ing the scope of a search incident to an arrest.
2 A lawful arrest is one based on probable cause. Whitley v. Warden, 401 U.S.
560 (1971); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Mears v. Commonwealth,
499 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1973). Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances within
the knowledge of the officer contemplating the arrest are sufficient to warrant a per-
son of "reasonable caution" in the belief that an offense has been committed by the
person to be arrested. Furthermore, since an arrest is a form of seizure in the consti-
tutional sense, probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search essentially are
treated as synonomous. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Berkshire v.
Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1971).
3 574 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1978).
1 577 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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house was not incident to a lawful arrest, and expressly pro-
scribed by Chimel, where the arrest was effectuated on the
front porch. The substantially variant proximities of the two
defendants to the areas of search may be a plausible basis for
asserting that the rulings are consistent;5 however, a consider-
ation of the Collins and Taylor opinions reveals that the ar-
ticulated theories used to explain the decisions reflect the in-
evitable confusion spawned by the vague rule enunciated in
Chimel.
In Chimel, the United States Supreme Court considered
the constitutional propriety of an attendant search that en-
compassed the arrestee's entire house.' The Court was careful
to reiterate the fundamental proposition that, in the absence
of a well recognized exception, a warrantless search is per se
5 The Chimel Court itself found such distinctions to be "highly artificial." 395
U.S. 752, 766 (1969).
' In Chimel, police officers, armed with an arrest warrant but no search warrant,
were admitted to the defendant's home by his wife, where they awaited his arrival.
When he entered he was served with the warrant. Although he denied the officers'
request to "look around" they conducted a search of the entire house on the basis of a
lawful arrest. The Supreme Court, reversing the California appellate courts, held that
a search incident to a lawful arrest extends only to the arrestee's person and the area
within his immediate control into which he might reach for a weapon or destructible
evidence.
The right of a police officer to conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee has
been recognized by the Supreme Court for many years. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40 (1968); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Go-Bart Imp. Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,
199 (1927). Likewise, Kentucky courts have long accepted this principle. Deberry v.
Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1973); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 258 S.W.2d
497, 499 (Ky. 1953); Turner v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W. 519, 521 (Ky. 1921). This
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement first appeared in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (dictum).
Other long established exceptions to the warrant requirement include searches
made in "hot pursuit" of a dangerous suspect: United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38
(1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297-300 (1967); Styles v. Commonwealth,
507 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1974); limited "stop and frisk" searches made on the street:
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Do-
berry v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1973); searches by consent- United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973); Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1977); searches conducted
pursuant to probable cause and exigent circumstances: United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973); Middleton v.
Commonwealth, 502 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1973); searches of impounded vehicles for in-
ventory purposes: South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-76 (1976); Cooper v.
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unreasonable8 and is thus violative of fourth amendment
strictures.9 With this background, the Court then set out to
restrict the scope of a search incident to an arrest.10 However,
in attempting to define the permissible ambit of such a
search, the Court employed language sufficiently ambiguous
that commentators,11 scholars,1 2 law enforcement personnel' s
and courts1" have since embarked upon diverse and contradic-
California, 386 U.S. 58, 58-62 (1967); Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352 (Ky.
1979); seizure of articles in "plain view": G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429
U.S. 338 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); Rudolph v.
Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1971); but, an officer's observation of an item
within plain view does not constitute a search. Caine v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d
824, 828 (Ky. 1973).
8 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The Chimel Court cited the
earlier decision of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) as support for this prin-
ciple. The "per se unreasonable" language actually appears in the Katz opinion. Id.
at 357-58.
9 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Ky. CONST. § 10 for essentially the same provision.
10 See note 15 infra for a list of writers who question the success of this attempt.
1 Note, Search and Seizure Since Chimel v. California, 55 MINN. L. Rxv. 1011
(1971); Note, A Reexamination of the Search Incidental to Arrest Doctrine, 56 Tnx.
L. REV. 1077 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reexamination].
12 Aaronson and Wallace, A Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment's Doc-
trine of Search Incident to an Arrest, 64 GEO. L.J. 53 (1970); Cook, Warrantless
Searches Incident to Arrest, 24 ALA. L. REv. 607 (1972); Lewis, Mannle and Allen,
Burger Court and Searches Incident to a Lawful Arrest: The Current Perspective, 7
CAP. U. L. REv. 1 (1977).
13 Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police Response, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW.
559 (1970).
14 This fundamental flaw in the operative language of Chimel has resulted in
inconsistent application of the search incident to arrest exception at both the state
and federal levels. With regard to state cases compare Neal v. State, 250 So.2d 605
(Ala. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Spiety, 531 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1975); People v. Valdez,
511 P.2d 472 (Colo. 1973); State v. Miles, 545 P.2d 484 (Idaho 1976); People v. Robin-
son, 379 N.E.2d 1264 (IMI. App. Ct. 1978); City of Centerville v. Smith, 332 N.E.2d 69
(Ohio Ct. App. 1973) with State v. Barker, 547 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976);
Spinkelink v. State, 313 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1975); Scott v. State, 176 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1970); State v. Gordon, 332 So.2d 262 (La. 1976); State v. Cox, 200 N.W.2d 305
(Minn. 1972); State v. Brasel, 538 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1976) (en banc), People v. Fitz-
patrick, 300 N.E.2d 139 (N.Y. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). At the federal
level compare United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1978) with United
1979-1980]
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tory avenues of interpretation. More specifically, in sustaining
the petitioner's contention that the search of his entire house
was unconstitutional, the Court stated: "there is ample justifi-
cation, [however] for a search of the arrestee's person and the
area 'within his immediate control' construing that phrase to
mean the area from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence. '15 As justification for per-
mitting such warrantless searches, the Court pointed to the
need to ensure the safety of arresting officers and to the desir-
ability of preserving valuable evidence for trial.1
States v. Wright, 577 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978).
15 395 U.S. at 763 (1969) (emphasis added). Hence the Supreme Court fully rec-
ognized the validity of a warrantless search directed at not only the arrestee's person
but also the area within his immediate control. The Court stated that any search
aimed at an area outside the arrestee's immediate control "may be made only under
the authority of a search warrant." Id. It is in this latter respect, that the Chimel
decision overruled the earlier cases of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)
and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), which stood for the proposition that
a warrantless search incident to an arrest may extend to the area that is considered to
be in the possession or under the contol of the arrestee. This property oriented ap-
proach resulted in the search of an entire house as being properly incident to an
arrest. This led the Chimel Court to expressly prohibit routine searches of rooms
other than that in which the arrest occurred. 395 U.S. at 763. For the theory that
Chimel did not completely undermine the Rabinowitz-Harris rationale see Aaronson
and Wallace, supra note 12, at 70; Reexamination, supra note 11, at 1079; Comment,
Scope of a Search Incident to Arrest: Missouri's Application of the Exception, 42
Mo. L. REv. 668, 671 (1977).
Interestingly enough, Kentucky also rejected the Harris-Rabinowitz rationale but
did so a full decade prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chimel. In disallowing
the search in Benge v. Commonwealth, 321 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1959), under a similar
fact pattern as that in Chimel, the then highest court of Kentucky, the Court of Ap-
peals, stated, "It is our view that every pertinent provision of the Fourth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution was by passed when each search [the search of an entire
apartment in Harris and the search of a one room business in Rabinowitz] and the
results thereof were stamped by those cases [Harris and Rabinowitz] with validity."
Id. at 249.
The Chimel standard also has been applied to the search of an automobile where
one of its occupants has been arrested. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures
of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REv. 835 (1974); Note, The Permissible Scope of a
Premises Search Incident to Arrest Under Chimel v. California: Divergent Defini-
tions of "Immediate Control" Plague the Lower Courts, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 350, 354
n.16 (1975-76) [hereinafter cited as Divergent Definitions]; Note, Criminal Law: The
Effect of Chimel v. California on Automobile Search and Seizure, 23 Ox" L. Rv.
447 (1970).
1" 395 U.S. at 762-63. At least two scholars have expressed the need to differenti-
ate between these two objectives when considering the validity of a search incident to
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Therefore, application of the Chimel rule inevitably in-
volves determining whether a search incident to an arrest oc-
curred within an area over which the arrestee exercised "im-
mediate control;" the essential difficulty in defining "the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon
or evidentiary items" 12 is reflected by the inconsistent lower
court decisions dealing with incidental searches.18 As stated
by one commentator, "[tjhe essence of the problem is this: Is
the standard properly understood to define an area of speci-
fied radius with the arrestee at its center, or is this a purpo-
sive definition with each case to be evaluated in terms of the
capability of the arrestee to reach a weapon or evidentiary
items?"1 9
an arrest. Aaronson and Wallace, supra note 12, at 83.
127 395 U.S. at 763 (1969).
18 See note 14 supra for a list of some of these cases.
1" Cook, supra note 12, at 621. Since the Chimel decision was rendered in 1969,
the Supreme Court has had only a handful of opportunities to consider the permissi-
ble scope of a search incident to an arrest as it relates to the arrestee's premises. Hill
v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Von Cleef v.
New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814 (1969) and Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969) in-
volve pre-Chimel searches. The incident searches conducted by the police in Vale,
Von Cleef and Shipley were held to be constitutionally offensive even when examined
under pre-Chimel standards. See note 15 supra for a brief description of the Harris-
Rabinowitz rationale. The question of Chimel's retroactivity was thereby preserved
for consideration in Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971). Therein the Su-
preme Court ruled that Chimel need not be applied retroactively and consequently in
Hill, the search of an entire apartment was judged by the Harris-Rabinowitz stan-
dard and found to be valid. None of these cases, however, provided any significant
insight as to the operative language of Chimel.
With regard to incident searches directed at the arrestee's person, the Supreme
Court has provided somewhat more substance. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), the Court held that a police
officer who has effectuated an arrest for a traffic violation may search the arrestee
without a warrant and regardless of the actual necessity to do so. For a discussion of
these companion cases see Comment, Search Incident to Arrest for Minor Traffic
Violations, 11 Am. ClM. L. REv. 801 (1973). In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S.
800 (1974), the Court ruled that once an individual is in custody, the effects in his
possession at the time of arrest may be subject to a subsequent warrantless search on
the basis of the lawful arrest. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) presented the
converse situation. There it was determined that when there is probable cause to
arrest and there is reason to believe that evidence will be destroyed, a limited search
prior to arrest may be conducted. For an analysis of Edwards and Cupp see Lewis,
Mannle, and Allen, supra note 12.
Any attempt to outline the cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1969 in-
volving the search of an automobile as incident to an arrest would be an unrealistic
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In grappling with defining what constitutes an "area
within the [arrestee's] immediate control," the courts have es-
sentially adopted one of two analytical approaches. The first
mode of analysis, termed the "physical proximity" test, 0 fo-
cuses on the arrestee's hypothetical ability to reach a particu-
lar item within his immediate vicinity. Under this standard,
the validity of the search will depend upon whether it was
conducted within a region from which one might gain access
to a weapon or evidence without regard to his actual ability to
do so. Arguably, since the articulated justifications for the
search incident to arrest exception are the need to protect law
enforcement personnel and to prevent the destruction of evi-
dence, the search should end after the arrestee is sufficiently
under control so as to pose no threat to person or evidence.21
However, some courts acknowledge the validity of the search
of an entire room where an arrest occurs-even after the ar-
restee is restrained-and emphasize the hypothetical control
of the accused over that area as of the moment of arrest.22
The arrestee's actual capacity to seize an item is given no
consideration.
The second mode of analysis used in ascertaining the
"area within the [arrestee's] control," the "factual analysis"
test,2 3 focuses on the arrestee's actual ability to exert control
over an item within the immediate area. Presumably, if the
surrounding vicinity is not subject to the arrestee's control
there is no possibility of his gaining possession of a weapon or
evidence, and consequently any search of the area would ex-
ceed the permissible limits of a search incident to an arrest.
effort. However, for an excellent review of this matter see Case Notes - The War-
rantless Search of a Double-Locked Footlocker, Located in an Automobile Trunk at
the Time of Arrest, One and One-Half Hours After Arrest, is Not Justified by the
"Automobile Exception" or as a "Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest" and This is
Violative of the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause and Legitimate Expectation
of Privacy-United States v. Chadwick, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 421 (1977-78); in conjunc-
tion with Note, Warrantless Search and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L. Ray.
835 (1974).
20 Divergent Definitions, supra note 15, at 356-57.
21 See notes 65-66 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this principle.
22 See Spinkelink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1975); Scott v. State, 176 S.E.2d
481 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970).
13 Divergent Definitions, supra note 15, at 356-57.
[Vol. 68
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Since this approach involves a concomitant determination as
to the arrestee's reaching ability, those courts which adhere to
it engage in a detailed examination of the circumstances sur-
rounding the arrest-particularly, the number of officers pres-
ent, the capabilities of the arrestee, the position of the officers
in relation to the arrestee, and the physical restraints em-
ployed to effectuate the arrest.2
The uncertainty as to the meaning of the Chimel doctrine
is vividly illustrated by the Collins and Taylor opinions. Jus-
tice Clayton's majority opinion for the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Collins details support for the physical proximity
test, rejecting Collins' argument that the search exceeded
Chimel standards in that the physical restraints placed upon
him by the arresting officers effectively eliminated his access
to a weapon or evidence.25 In contrast, Justice Lukowsky, the
lone dissenter, engaged in a detailed examination of the re-
cord to determine the arrestees' actual ability to reach a
weapon or destructible evidence. He concluded that the ar-
restees were sufficiently restrained so as to render the imme-
diate area beyond their control.2 6 Similarly, the unanimous
decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Taylor ap-
peared to employ the very method of analysis which was re-
jected by a majority of the Collins Court.
A. Collins v. Commonwealth: The Supreme Court's Inter-
pretation of Chimel.
Since the fourth amendment is cast in terms of "reasona-
bleness," 27 any determination as to the constitutionality of a
search necessarily involves an inquiry into the particular cir-
cumstances surrounding that search. Therefore, a brief
description of the facts as posed by Collins v. Common-
wealth28 is in order. In Collins, police officers were informed
by a motel owner that tires had been observed in the bath-
24 Id. at 368.
28 See notes 28-31 infra and accompanying text for a consideration of United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
28 See note 35 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this principle.
27 See note 9 supra for the exact language of the amendment.
28 574 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1978).
1979-1980]
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room of the unit rented to Collins and his nephew. This infor-
mation, coupled with a reported theft of tires the prior day
from a service station, precipitated an investigation. Upon ar-
riving at the room, the three officers requested permission to
inspect the premises. Collins consented, and a subsequent
search revealed only black marks in the bathtub. Prior to
leaving the motel, the officers were told by an employee that
an object had been thrown from the bathroom window of Col-
lins' unit. A canvass of the area below the window exposed an
automatic handgun and a key case containing what was be-
lieved to be heroin. After returning to the room, the officers
placed both occupants under arrest and in so doing made a
cursory search of their persons. Pillows on the bed were then
searched, and discovering nothing, the officers ordered the ar-
restees to sit down. Thereafter, one of the officers proceeded
to search the control panel of the nearby air conditioner and
found a bus station locker key. Pursuant to a warrant, the po-
lice subsequently conducted a search of the corresponding
locker and found more heroin and various drug parapherna-
lia.29 The Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately upheld the
warrantless search of the air conditioner as incident to a law-
ful arrest.
1. Justice Clayton's Application of the Physical Proximity
Test
Writing for the majority, Justice Clayton left no doubt
that the physical proximity interpretation of the Chimel rule
is the proper mode to be applied in determining the validity
of an attendant search directed at an arrestee's residence. Col-
lins contended that "the arrestees were under police control to
such an extent that the possibility of [his] gaining access to
the air conditioner to reach a weapon or evidence was mini-
mal."30 The Court rejected this argument, stating that Chimel
does not require "a police officer to weigh an arrestee's
probability of success of obtaining a weapon or destructible
29 Id.
30 Id. at 297.
[Vol. 68
1979-1980] SURVEY-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
evidence before conducting a search incident to an arrest."3 1
Rather, the Court focused on Collins' hypothetical ability to
pose a threat to life or evidence.
Justice Clayton's citation of language from Watkins v.
United States32 as supportive of his position further evidences
3I Id. In support of this notion the Collins court cited United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973) in which the United States Supreme Court basically held that
police officers who lawfully arrest an individual for a traffic violation may conduct a
warrantless search of that person for weapons without regard to the actual need for
such a search.
Arguably, the majority's reliance upon Robinson was misplaced because the inci-
dental search in that case was directed at the arrestee's person, while in both Collins
and Chimel, the search was of the premises where the arrest occurred. Recognition by
the Supreme Court of such a distinction can be found in the Robinson opinion itself,
wherein it was stated:
[The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement] has
historically been formulated into two distinct propositions. The first is that
a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the fact of
the lawful arrest. The second is that a search may be made of the area
within the immediate control of the arrestee.
414 U.S. at 224. Such a distinction was recognized by Kentucky's highest court in
Manning v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1959). The United States Supreme
Court went on to indicate that while the law applicable to the incident search of an
arrestee's person was "settled," the law regarding the incident search of a premises is
"subject to differing interpretations as to the extent of the area which may be
searched." 414 U.S. at 224.
Therefore, because Robinson is concerned only with an incident search of an ar-
restee's person, it is of little value in defining the permissible scope of a search of a
premises as incident to an arrest. For a critical analysis of Robinson, see Note, Re-
stricting the Scope of Searches Incident to an Arrest: United States v. Robinson, 59
VA. L. REv. 724 (1973); Comment, Search Incident to Arrest for Minor Traffic Viola-
tions, 11 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 801 (1973).
32 564 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 936 (1978). In Watkins, the
Sixth Circuit held a search to be proper as incident to a lawful arrest and in so doing
concentrated on the proximity of the defendant to the gun while explicitly stating
that his actual ability to reach the weapon was an irrelevant factor to consider in
determining the validity of an incident search. The defendant was arrested in his
bathrobe by two police officers, who accompanied him to his bedroom so that he
could get a shirt. While in the bedroom, they noticed the butt of a gun protruding
from under the bed's mattress. The court summarily stated, "Since the gun in ques-
tion was within the defendant's reach . . . the seizure of the weapon under the cir-
cumstances of this event was lawful." Id. at 205. The facts of Watkins indicate that
the "plain view" doctrine may have been the more appropriate exception to the war-
rant requirement to apply. For a critical discussion of cases such as Watkins, in
which the scope of incidental searches is manipulated, see Divergent Definitions,
supra note 15, at 377-78; Reexamination, supra note 11, at 1080-87.
Since its decision in Watkins, the Sixth Circuit has not considered the scope of
an incident search directed at the premises where the arrest was effectuated. How-
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his application of the physical proximity test. In Watkins, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "'even after a defen-
dant has been restrained pursuant to arrest, the search of an
area from which he might gain possession of a weapon is law-
ful.' "a This dictum presupposes that an arrestee's actual
ability to gain possession of a nearby article is immaterial and
that only his fictitious ability to do so is relevant in determin-
ing the permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest.
Furthermore, the majority of the Court in Collins noted that
the item searched was within the arrestee's hypothetical reach
ever, in United States v. Wright, 577 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit ap-
peared to solidify its adherence to the physical proximity test in holding that the
search of an airline passenger's locked suitcase by drug enforcement officials could
not be justified as a search incident to an arrest. Therein, the defendant was sus-
pected of transporting heroin and was detained by an agent prior to disembarking. At
this time, the agent seized the defendant's baggage claim check. After using the re-
ceipt to obtain the luggage, the agent then took it to the same room where the defen-
dant had been taken and proceeded to conduct a thorough search.
In ruling on the validity of the search, the court noted its continued support for
the proposition that the right to search, once it has attached, does not dissipate de-
spite the fact that the arrestee is sufficiently restrained so as to prevent his gaining
possession of a weapon or evidence. Presumably, the court reasoned that since the
defendant did not possess the suitcase at the time of arrest, the right to search never
attached and therefore any incidental search was imegal. However, to the extent the
court relied on the cited case of United States v. Griffith, 537 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1976)
it muddied its position regarding the proper test to apply. Therein, the Seventh Cir-
cuit commented on the scope of an incident search:
Once a suspect is under the control of the arresting officers, the area of
permissible search under Chimel is narrowed accordingly. [The] reason un-
derlying the limited right of search allowed in Chimel is the danger that the
defendant will seize a weapon or destructible evidence, and whether that
danger exists depends upon the circumstances of each case.
Id. at 904 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit obviously was utilizing the factual
analysis test. In fact, the dissenting opinion in Collins cited Griffith as supportive of
its position. 574 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Ky. 1978).
Prior to Watkins, the Sixth Circuit assumed contradictory positions with regard
to the proper approach for determining the permissible ambit of an incident search.
Compare United States v. Kaye, 492 F.2d 744 (6th Cir. 1974) (search of suitcase when
defendant was "subdued" was properly incident to an arrest as long as the suitcase
was within an area from which the defendant might have reached at the time of the
arrest) with United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1973) (search of closet
approximately four feet from the nearest arrestee exceeded Chimel standards in that
the area was not in the arrestee's immediate control since the officers had secured the
situation).
" Collins v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Ky. 1978) (quoting from Wat-
kins v. United States, 564 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1977)).
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and as such it was properly subject to search under Chimel. In
refusing to examine the actualities of the arrest and in citing
the Watkins dictum, the Kentucky Supreme Court made it
manifestly clear that the physical proximity test was the ap-
plicable standard by which to determine the proper scope of a
search incident to an arrest in Kentucky.
2. Justice Lukowsky's Argument for the Factual Analysis
Test
Arguing with equal conviction as that demonstrated by
Justice Clayton for the majority, Justice Lukowsky contended
that the search of the air conditioner "was unlawful and evi-
dence obtained by the use of the key should have been sup-
pressed as 'fruit of the poisonous tree.' " A detailed factual
analysis yielded the conclusion that Collins had been suffi-
ciently restrained so as to render the air conditioner beyond
the area of his immediate control.
35
After emphasizing that the search was one of a closed
compartment, Justice Lukowsky pointed to language from
Chimel directly concerning the permissibility of such a search:
There is no comparable justification, however, for rou-
tinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest
occurs-or, for that matter, for searching through all the
desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself. Such searches may be made only under the authority
of a search warrant. The "adherence to judicial processes"
mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less.38
Furthermore, Justice Lukowsky cited other factors which led
him to the incontrovertible conclusion that the area searched
incident to the arrest was beyond the arrestee's immediate
control. Specifically, he stated:
At the time of the arrest there were three officers in the
31 Id. at 299 (Lukowsky, J., dissenting).
35 It should be pointed out that this writer does not question the validity of the
actual result reached in either the majority or minority opinions. Rather, it is the
appropriateness of the method employed to arrive at those conclusions that is the
focus of this portion of the survey.
:6 574 S.W.2d at 299 (Lukowsky, J., dissenting) (quoting from Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)).
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room, certainly more than sufficient manpower to prevent
Walter [Collins] from reaching the panel. Unless Walter was
an acrobat, a Houdini or Stretcho-Man I can not conceive
how the panel could have fallen within the area of his imme-
diate control. To say that the panel, four to eight feet away,
was an area into which he was able to reach, despite the fact
that an armed officer stood between him and it, would defy
credulity.
3 7
The dissenter also relied on United States v. Griffith3 and
United States v. Skye3 9 for the proposition that "[o]nce a sus-
pect is under the control of the arresting officers, the area of
permissible search under Chimel is narrowed accordingly."'40
Justice Lukowsky cited language from the Griffith opinion
which emphatically asserts that Chimel permits only a "lim-
ited right of search"4 based on "the danger that the defen-
dant will seize a weapon or destructible evidence.
42
Justice Lukowsky clearly challenges the physical pronim-
37 Id.
' 537 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1976). The defendant in Griffith was arrested while in
his undershorts with six officers present in his hotel room. As the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals later observed, "[the] defendant offered no resistance and did not
comport himself in a threatening manner or give any indication of an intent to flee."
Id. at 902. Subsequent to the arrest, the defendant was allowed to move about the
room, without being handcuffed, to get dressed. During this time, the officers
searched a closed suitcase on the bed and the adjacent bathroom. Also searched was a
small open bag located next to the suitcase. In subsequently holding these searches to
be illegal, the Seventh Circuit stated, "the search of the bathroom, a 'room other than
that in which [the] arrest occur[red]'. . . was forbidden by Chimel, as was the search
of the suitcase." Id. at 903. With regard to the open sack, the Court ruled that after
the defendant had been "immobilized" it was not within his immediate control or
"was within that area only because the officers had deliberately chosen to allow [the]
defendant to move near the sack". Id. at 904.
"' 473 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1973). In Skye, six or seven armed officers arrested
several defendants in an apartment and in so doing placed them against the living
room wall to search their persons for weapons. Thereafter, other officers checked the
rest of the apartment and a sack of money, located only a few feet from one of the
suspects, was seized. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in holding the search to be
improper stated "the officers had the situation completely under control." Id. at 1066.
As such "the area from which the sack was seized was not within the suspect's imme-
diate control." Id.
40 Collins v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Ky. 1978) (Lukowsky, J., dis-
senting) (quoting from United States v. Griffith, 537 F.2d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 1976)).
41 Id.
42 Id.
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ity test by not viewing the arrestee's hypothetical control over
the area of reach as a salient consideration in determining the
validity of the search. Rather, he contends that the arrestee
had no actual ability to exercise control over the area within
which the air conditioner was located and thus a search of
that air conditioner was illegal under Chimel standards.
B. Taylor v. Commonwealth: The Alignment of the Court of
Appeals with Justice Lukowsky
In Taylor v. Commonwealth,43 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals seemed to employ the very method of analysis that
was rejected by the majority in Collins. In Taylor, the
defendant fled from the scene of a robbery to a residence and
was followed by an employee of the victimized store. Upon
being notified by this employee of the defendant's wherea-
bouts, the police approached the house and questioned the
defendant. After a brief conversation at the door, the officers
placed the defendant under arrest. Although the defendant
was at no time beyond the front room of what was described
as a "shotgun type building, that is,. . . long and narrow,"
44
the officers searched the entire house on the basis of the law-
ful arrest. At the rear of the house, the officers "discovered, by
rolling back the floor covering, a trapdoor leading to the base-
ment, '45 wherein "fruits" of the robbery were found.
In unanimously holding the search to be constitutionally
offensive, the court of appeals cited Chimel for the proposi-
tion that "warrantless searches, whether or not incident to ar-
rest, are the exception and not the rule."'4" The court further
noted that such a search of an area within the immediate con-
trol of the arrestee "is only justified where the exigency of the
situation demands it," 47 that is, where there exists some
threat to life or evidence. 8 In determining whether exigent
circumstances existed at the time of the search, the court in-
4- 577 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
41 Id. at 48.
45 Id.
46Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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terpreted Chimel to mandate a balancing test, weighing "the
right of the individual to be free from unreasonable intrusions
against the need of society to effectively investigate criminal
offenses. '49 Such a process necessarily entails an examination
by a court of the circumstances surrounding a search prior to
rendering a ruling as to its constitutional propriety. 0
That the Taylor court was applying the factual analysis
test was further evidenced by the fact that it cited the exact
language from Chimel regarding the attendant search of
closed or concealed areas as did Justice Lukowsky in his Col-
lins dissent.5 1 The court likewise pointed to United States v.
Griffith52 and United States v. Skye 53 and indicated that
"once the suspect is under the control of the police officers,
the area of permissible search is narrowed accordingly. " " This
reliance upon these two decisions aligns the unanimous Tay-
lor court with Justice Lukowsky, and it is apparent that the
court of appeals felt that the method of analysis used by the
majority of the Supreme Court in Collins was unsound.
C. Evaluation of Collins and Taylor in Light of Fourth
Amendment Standards and the Chimel Guidelines
Justice Lukowsky, and members of the Taylor court, as
advocates of what is denominated the "factual analysis" test,
would proscribe the warrantless search of the area surround-
ing the arrestee once he is restrained sufficiently so as to
render it beyond his control. The validity of the factual analy-
sis approach depends upon the reasonableness of this prohibi-
tion in light of established fourth amendment principles.""
The United States Supreme Court has long adhered to the
proposition that warrantless searches are the exception and
49 Id. at 49.
'0 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969).
61 See note 36 supra and accompanying text for the language cited by Justice
Lukowsky.
52 537 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1976). See note 38 supra for a brief description of the
facts involved in Griffith.
53 473 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1973). See note 39 supra for a brief description of the
facts involved in Skye.
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
66 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969).
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not the rule.5 6 Moreover, as was implicitly noted in Chimel,
the reasonableness of any warrantless search involves balanc-
ing the privacy interests of the individual against the needs of
law enforcement.5
56 See note 62 infra and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the Supreme
Court's preference of procurement of a warrant prior to a search.
57 395 U.S. at 762-63 (1969). For explicit reference to this balancing process, see
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1971); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967).
Authority for such a balancing approach exists within the language and form of the
fourth amendment itself. As one commenator noted: "One clause promises freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures, implying that reasonable searches may oc-
cur; the other requires that warrants issue only upon probable cause, thus providing
[for] supervised governmental entry in certain situations." Reexamination, supra
note 11, at 1077.
The Supreme Court has, on occasion, employed a greater-lesser intrusion test to
determine the reasonableness of a warrantless search. This approach, essentially a
derivative of the balancing test, was first expounded in Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970). In Chambers, the police stopped an automobile and arrested its occu-
pants shortly after the commission of an armed robbery of a nearby service station.
The stop was justified on the basis of information supplied by the victim and other
witnesses. The car in which the arrestees were riding was taken to the police station
where a warrantless search thereof revealed a substantial amount of incriminating
evidence. In holding the search to be proper, Justice White, writing for the majority
of the Court, concluded that the existence of probable cause and exigent circum-
stances justified the warrantless search. With regard to requiring a warrant in such a
situation, the Court stated:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the
unmobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is ob-
tained; arguably, only the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the magis-
trate authorizes the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which is the
"lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question .... For constitutional
purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding
a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 51-52. In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805 (1974), the Supreme
Court, again with Justice White writing the majority opinion, employed this approach
in justifying a warrantless search of an arrested defendant after ten hours of
confinement.
Arguably, the same rationale could be applied to the fact patterns presented in
Collins and Taylor. Since the crime for which the defendant was lawfully arrested
involved "fruits," it is likely that the police also would have probable cause to search
the arrestee's premises. Furthermore, the exigencies could be supplied by the possi-
bility of evidence being destroyed by third parties after the police have arrested the
defendant and removed him from the premises but before they have returned to exe-
cute the search warrant. For the basis of this argument, see Chimel v. California, 395
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Any legitimate consideration of privacy interests necessa-
rily must take into account the constitutional devices
designed to protect those interests, 58 such as the warrant re-
quirement, 59 and the corresponding need to avoid adopting in-
terpretive schemes that serve to undermine those devices. The
warrant process interposes a neutral magistrate between law
enforcement officials and private individuals to determine the
reasonableness of any proposed intrusion.60 Simply put, the
U.S. 752, 774 (1969) (White, J., dissenting). In this context, which would be the
greater intrusion-conducting an immediate warrantless search based on the arrest-
ing officer's own judgment as to the existence of probable cause or posting a guard at
the premises and then submitting the probable cause issue to a magistrate? It is con-
ceivable that a warrantless search may be less intrusive, if justified under Chimel, in
that it is confined to the area of the arrestee's immediate control while procurement
of a warrant may subject the entire premises to a search.
Nevertheless, any attempt to apply this greater-lesser reasoning to situations
such as that in Collins and Taylor will be thwarted by the obvious fact that Cham-
bers involved an automobile search and Collins and Taylor involved the search of
premises. In fact, the Supreme Court in Chambers expressly recognized this distinc-
tion and indicated that it was of sufficient magnitude as to preclude adopting the
Chambers rationale in situations involving the search of a premises. Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1970). Kentucky has likewise recognized such an exception.
ScUllion v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W. 307 (Ky. 1974).
Furthermore, this greater-lesser approach contemplates that an investigative of-
ficer's determination of probable cause is tantamount to that made by a disinterested
judicial officer. The Supreme Court, however, continually has expressed a preference
for a decision regarding probable cause to be made by a neutral detached magistrate.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960). See note 62 infra for a list of cases
in which the Supreme Court has encouraged the use of a warrant. Kentucky's highest
court has likewise indicated this preference. Gossett v. Commonwealth, 426 S.W.2d
485 (Ky. 1968). More specifically, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Ventusia,
380 U.S. 102 (1964), retrospectively examined the conclusions it reached with regard
to the warrantless searches in Johnson v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), and
stated that, "[h]ad the proper course of obtaining a warrant from the magistrate been
followed and had the magistrate on the same evidence available to the police made a
finding of probable cause, the search under the warrant would have been sustained."
Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
8 Privacy interests are only as viable as the means designed to protect those
interests are strong. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977).
59 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See note 9, supra for the language of the amendment.
See generally United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1977).
o Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1962). As the Supreme
Court noted in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), "judicial warrant has a
significant role to play in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magis-
trate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried
judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.'" Id. at 9.
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warrant requirement "separates law judgment from law en-
forcement. 6 1 That this requirement is axiomatic to the crimi-
nal justice system is borne out by the fact that the Supreme
Court over the years continually has expounded its preference
for the obtainment of a warrant prior to any search.6 2 Thus,
the need to preserve the integrity of the warrant requirement
is superimposed on this entire balancing process.
It has been suggested that ninety percent of all searches
receiving court consideration have been those that are inci-
dent to an arrest.6" This has caused some commentators to
conclude that this particular exception poses a substantial
threat to the continued viability of the warrant requirement.6
While the accuracy of this figure may be debatable, one fact
remains: if the constitutional provision requiring a warrant
prior to search is not to be subverted, the search incident to
arrest exception must be tied strictly to the justifications that
permit it. 65 This fact was recognized explicity by the Supreme
Court in the Chimel opinion itself.6 Therefore, at that mo-
61 Aaronson and Wallace, supra note 12, at 54.
62 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762 (1969); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967). Perhaps the strongest
statement by the Supreme Court regarding its preference for warrants exists in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), wherein it was stated "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 357. Gallman v. Commonwealth,
578 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1979) indicates that Kentucky also adheres to this principle.
Moreover, in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the
Supreme Court unequivocably proclaimed:
The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead language.
Rather, it has been "a valued part of our constitutional law for decades
.... It is, or should be, an important part of our machinery of govern-
ment, operating as a matter of course to check the well-intentioned but
mistakenly over-zealous executive officers who are a part of any system of
law enforcement."
Id. at 315-16.
13 Aaronson and Wallace, supra note 12, at 54 n.5.
Id. at 54. Divorkin, Fast Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The
Limits of Lawyering, 48 INn. L.J. 329, 354 (1973).
05 The Supreme Court has long adhered to this philosophy. United States v.
Chadwick, 443 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68
(1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1925).
6 Quoting from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968), the Chimel Court stated
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ment when the arrestee poses no actual threat to life or evi-
dence - that is, when the justifications for a warrantless inci-
dent search do not exist, Chimel and the fourth amendment
demand that a warrant be obtained if a search is to be
conducted.
By requiring a police officer to obtain a search warrant
after the suspect has been arrested and otherwise subdued,
the proponents of the factual analysis test have, arguably, im-
posed an unreasonable burden on law enforcement. The po-
lice, if desirous of searching the area immediately surrounding
the accused 67 after his arrest, would be inconvenienced in that
they would have to leave the premises to procure a warrant
and subsequently return to execute it.65 However, a similar
"inconvenience" argument was rejected in Chimel wherein the
Supreme Court held that it was reasonable to require police to
obtain a search warrant for a residence in which an arrest had
been effectuated.6 9 The Court reasoned that since the "entire
house" was not within the suspect's control, there would be no
justification for a warrantless search of that area. This same
rationale would apply with equal force to the search, albeit
one of smaller dimensions, of the area immediately surround-
ing the accused once it has been rendered beyond his control
by virtue of an arrest. 0 Therefore, absent exigent circum-
that "'[t]he scope of [a] search must be strictly tied to and jusified by the circum-
stances which rendered its initiation permissible.'" After noting that the limited
search in Terry was proper under this test because it was a "'protective. .. search
for weapons,'" the Court went on to say that "[a] similar analysis underlies the
'search incident to arrest' principle, and marks its proper extent." 395 U.S. at 762
(emphasis added).
11 Chimel expressly held that a search outside this area "may be made only
under the authority of a search warrant." Id. at 763.
68 Presumably, if there is more than one officer present, one would secure the
premises while the other obtained a warrant. Arguably, there would be no difference
between, on the one hand, securing and otherwise seizing the premises before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate, and, on the other hand, con-
ducting an immediate search without a warrant. See note 57 supra as to why this
rationale cannot be employed to justify a warrantless search in this context.
395 U.S. at 763.
70 Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Payton v. New
York, No. 78-5420 (U.S. April 15, 1980), it is unlikely that this "inconvenience" argu-
ment will retain any viability. In Payton, the Court held that, absent exigent circum-
stances, police must obtain an arrest warrant prior to entering an individual's home
to arrest him. Generally then, police will have the opportunity to submit to the mag-
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stances, 1 requiring a police officer to obtain a warrant in this
situation is reasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment as interpreted by the Chimel Court itself."
To the extent the physical proximity test applied by the
Collins majority does not limit the scope of an incidental
search to the nature of its justifications, it is deficient. Under
the Collins approach, the prosecution need only prove7 3 that
the search occurred within "an area of specified radius with
the arrestee at its center" 74 to avail itself of the search inci-
istrate the issue of probable cause to search along with the issue of probable cause to
arrest. Thus, in many instances, the police will be armed with both arrest and search
warrants prior to confronting an accused in his home.
71 Arguably, the possibility of valuable evidence being destroyed by a third party
present at the scene of arrest would constitute exigent circumstances. However, in
Chimel, the Supreme Court found no exigencies to exist despite the presence of the
petitioner's wife at the time of his arrest. See note 6 supra for a brief description of
the facts in Chimel.
72 Of course, "exigent circumstances" could be redefined to include practical in-
conveniences to police. However, the Supreme Court has long adhered to the notion
that the warrant requirement "is not lightly to be dispensed with" absent some show-
ing of a compelling need. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). Tradition-
ally, this "need" has been substantially more than mere impracticabilities. See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (warrantless frisk of suspect stopped on street necessary for
officer's protection) and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless entry
and search by pursuing officers of house into which an armed felon had recently fled
was necessary to insure their protection and the protection of any bystanders). Fur-
thermore, in Payton v. New York, No. 78-5420 (U.S. April 15, 1980) the Supreme
Court recently declared that practical considerations must give way to the "constitu-
tional command" of the fourth amendment. Id.
73 In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951), and McDonald V. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1949), the Supreme Court clearly required that the prose-
cution bear the burden of proving that a warrantless search is justifiable under one of
the established exceptions to the warrant clause. Kentucky also places the burden on
the prosecution. Gallman v. Commonwealth, 578 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1979). However, in
terms of proving that the scope of a particular incidental search exceeded Chimel
standards, the Supreme Court has been silent. Both Collins v. Commonwealth, 574
S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1978) and Taylor v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979) presuppose that the prosecution carries the burden. For a review of how other
jurisdictions have allocated this burden see Divergent Definitions, supra note 15, at
356 n.18.
74 Cook, Warrantless Searches Incident to Arrest, ALA. L. REv. 607, 621 (1972).
Indeed, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Collins simply stated, "[Collins] was located
four to seven feet from the air conditioner. The air conditioner was therefore within
the immediate area where [the arrestee] might have reached." 574 S.W.2d at 298.
One commentator has argued that by requiring the prosecutor to prove only the
arrestee's physical proximity to the area searched rather than the arrestee's actual
ability to reach an item within that vicinity, an area test is adopted that "differs only
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dent to arrest exception. Since this method of defining the
area within the arrestee's immediate control focuses on dis-
tance and ignores an arrestee's actual ability to reach an item,
a warrantless search will be deemed proper notwithstanding
the fact that an arrestee poses no threat to life or evidence;
the sole requirement under the physical proximity test is that
the area of search be within the arrestee's hypothetical
reach. 5 Such an approach clearly circumvents the teachings
of Chimel and contributes to the subversion of the warrant
requirement.
The factual analysis test, on the other hand, as demon-
strated by Judge Lukowsky and the Taylor court accords with
Chimel in that it requires a detailed examination of the fac-
tual setting at the time of arrest in order to ascertain an arres-
tee's actual ability to reach an item,71 and ensures that a war-
rantless incidental search will not exceed its justifications."
This approach is flexible enough to promote the procurement
in degree from pre-Chimel, property related decisions that allowed a search of the
'premises' and that [consequently] there is still license for exploratory searches, albeit
ones of substantially delimited parameters." Comment, Scope of a Search Incident to
Arrest: Missouri's Application of the Exception, 42 Mo. L. REv. 668, 671 (1977). See
note 15 supra for a general discussion of pre-Chimel standards.
71 Presumably, this hypothetical ability to reach extends from four to seven feet.
Collins v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Ky. 1978).
76 Quoting from United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1949), the Chimel
Court stated that "'[t]he recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches' de-
pends upon 'the facts and circumstances the total atmosphere of the case.'" 395 U.S.
at 765.
7' In the recent case of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the United
States Supreme Court subtly indicated that if confronted with this issue, it would
adopt the factual analysis approach. The defendants in Sanders were suspected of
transporting controlled substances. After having deplaned, the two suspects obtained
a cab and left the airport. The police pursued and eventually intercepted them. Upon
apprehension, the police ordered the two defendants to get out of the cab. They com-
plied and were quickly placed against the side of the vehicle. Brief for Petitioner at 3,
442 U.S. at 753. At this point, the two officers opened both the cab's trunk and a
suitcase found therein. The Supreme Court commented in a footnote that although
the government has not attempted to justify this warrantless search as one incident
to an arrest, had it done so the Court would have rejected this justification because
"it appears that the bag was not within his 'immediate control' at the time of search."
442 U.S. at 764 n.11. Presumably, if the Court had applied the physical proximity
test, it would have found otherwise in that from the side of an average automobile to
its trunk - a distance of only a few feet - is certainly within the defendants' hypo-
thetical reach and thus within their immediate control.
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of a warrant78 and to permit a warrantless search when cir-
cumstances so mandate. 79 Admittedly, this test is not as easily
applied as the physical proximity test and as such would be
more time consuming. However, it has long been recognized
that justice, not judicial economy, is the ultimate goal of the
legal system.80
In light of the majority's position in Collins, it is appar-
ent that Kentucky has opted for the expedience of a mechani-
cal rule at the expense of the arrested person's fourth amend-
ment rights. Be that as it may, Collins does represent the law
with regard to the permissible scope of a search incident to an
arrest as determined by Kentucky's highest court.
II. AUTOMOBILE IMPOUNDMENTS AND INVENTORY SEARCHES
A. The Opperman Majority: Diminished Expectation of
Privacy
In South Dakota v. Opperman,1 the United States Su-
preme Court considered the constitutional propriety of police
inventory searches directed at impounded vehicles. In Opper-
man, the defendant's unattended but locked automobile had
been parked overnight in a restricted parking area in the Ver-
million, South Dakota business district. Being in violation of a
local parking ordinance, the car was ticketed twice during the
night. Ultimately, the automobile was impounded by police
and towed to the city lot. It was unlocked without the benefit
of keys and a standard inventory search was conducted. The
officer seized all items of value within plain view and also ex-
amined the contents of the closed, but unlocked glove com-
partment. The search of this area revealed a quantity of mari-
juana in a plastic bag. Opperman was subsequently arrested
and charged with possession of marijuana.8 ' At the suppres-
sion hearing, he did not challenge the reasonableness of seiz-
,8 See note 62 supra for a list of cases in which the Supreme Court has expressed
preference for obtaining a warrant.
"' See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text for a consideration of this
principle.
80 United States v. Crane, 499 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1974).
" 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
82 Id. at 365-66.
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ing items in plain view.83 Rather, he contended that the inven-
tory was unreasonable in scope in that it encompassed an
examination of closed areas within the auto, specifically, the
glove compartment.8 4 The motion to suppress was denied and
the evidence from the inventory search was subsequently con-
sidered by a jury in convicting Opperman of the possessory
offense.8
The Supreme Court ascertained the validity of the war-
rantless inventory search by balancing the need for the gov-
ernmental intrusion against the individual's privacy inter-
ests.86 As justification for the routine inventory procedure, the
Court cited the need to protect an automobile owner's prop-
erty, the need to protect police from false claims of theft, and
the need to ensure police safety. 7 With regard to the privacy
8 Id. at 376 n.10.
'4 Id. at 366-67.
On appeal, South Dakota's highest court reversed the conviction on the basis
that the evidence was obtained illegally. State v. Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D.
1975). This was the posture of the case pending consideration by the United States
Supreme Court. See text accompanying notes 109-110 infra for a description of the
final disposition of the case on remand. For an excellent, but pre-Opperman discus-
sion of warrantless automobile inventories, see Comment, Warrantless Search and
Seizure of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835 (1974).
86 The reasonableness of a governmental intrusion rests on balancing these two
competing interests. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967). The
Opperman Court reasoned that since inventories are of a non-investigatory nature,
the reasonableness standard rather than the probable cause standard of the fourth
amendment was applicable. Specifically, the Court stated:
The standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investiga-
tions, not routine, noncriminal procedures . . . . The probable cause ap-
proach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of rou-
tine administrative caretaking functions ....
In view of the noncriminal context of inventory searches, and the inap-
plicability in such a setting of the requirement of probable cause, courts
have held -- and quite correctly - that search warrants are not required,
linked as the warrant requirement textually is to the probable cause
concept.
Id. at 370 n.5.
87 428 U.S. at 369. For a critical examination of the underlying justifications for
an inventory search, see Note, The Final Word on Inventory Searches? - South
Dakota v. Opperman, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 834, 840-42 (1977); Comment, The After-
math of Cooper v. California: Warrantless Automobile Searches in Illinois, 1968 U.
ILL. L. F. 401, 407-08; Comment, Criminal Law - Search and Seizure - Fruits of
Warrantless Automobile Inventory Search Admissible, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 569, 578-81
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interests associated with an automobile, the Court observed
that "warrantless examinations of automobiles have been up-
held in circumstances in which a search of a home or office
would not."' In support of this diminished expectation of pri-
vacy, the Court noted that the inherent mobility of cars often
gives rise to exigent circumstances and, in such a context,
strict enforcement of the warrant requirement is impractica-
ble."' The Court also emphasized the "public nature of auto-
mobile travel"90 as a basis for this lesser expectation of pri-
vacy. After having cited numerous lower court decisions
permitting the inventory of closed glove compartments, 1 the
Opperman Court found the routine search to be in compli-
ance with the reasonableness standard of the fourth
amendment.
92
(1977); Comment, Automobile Inventories and the Fourth Amendment: South Da-
kota v. Opperman, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 186-88 (1977).
88 428 U.S. at 367.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 368. Nevertheless, automobiles are due some degree of constitutional
protection in that they are "effects" and thus within the scope of the fourth amend-
ment. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). Similarly, the Supreme Court
has stated that "[t]he word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461
(1971). Indeed, the Court explicitly stated in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891
(1975), that "[a] search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy."
Id. at 896.
91 428 U.S. at 371-72. The Supreme Court noted that these lower courts had
"recognized that standard inventories often include an examination of the glove com-
partment, since it is a customary place for documents of ownership and registration
... as well as a place for the temporary storage of valuables." Id.
92 Chief Justice Burger authored the plurality opinion joined by Justices Black-
mun, Rehnquist, and Stevens with Justice Powell filing a concurring opinion. Justice
Marshall dissented and was joined in his opinion by Justices Brennan and Stewart;
Justice White filed a separate dissenting opinion. One commentator has suggested
that Justice Stevens' replacement of Justice Douglas on the bench prior to the
Court's consideration of Opperman may have been determinative of the outcome
therein in that Douglas most probably would have dissented. Comment, Automobile
Inventories and the Fourth Amendment: South Dakota v. Opperman, 38 OHIO ST.
L.J. 177, 178 (1977).
Opperman effectively negated the leading Kentucky case in the area of automo-
bile inventory searches, City of Danville v. Dawson, 528 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1975). In
Dawson, City of Danville police stopped an erratically driven automobile and subse-
quently arrested its driver for being intoxicated. Having removed the driver to the
police cruiser, the police impounded the defendant's automobile and called for a
wrecker to tow it to a nearby storage area. While waiting for the wrecker to arrive,
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B. The Opposing Viewpoint: Consent as a Prerequisite to
Inventory Searches
1. Justice Marshall's Opperman Dissent
Justice Marshall, in a compelling dissent, interpreted the
Court's holding in Opperman to mean that:
a routine police inventory search of the closed glove com-
partment of a locked automobile impounded for ordinary
traffic violations ... may be made without attempting to
secure the consent of the owner and without any particular
reason to believe [that it] contains contraband, evidence, or
valuables, or presents any danger to... the public.9 3
Marshall contended that such a ruling does not reflect an ade-
quate reconciliation of the competing privacy and governmen-
tal interests involved. 4
While admitting that privacy expectations with regard to
automobiles may be less than those associated with a home or
office, Justice Marshall noted that "[t]he word automobile is
not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment
fades away. . . . " 5 Indeed, he recognized that "it is custom-
ary for people in this day to carry their most personal and
private papers and effects in their automobiles from time to
time.""'
Justice Marshall offered a series of convincing criticisms
of the three justifications relied upon by the Court in uphold-
ing routinely conducted inventory searches. He criticized the
"safety measure" justification as being of no import in the
case at hand for the record revealed that the inventory search
the officers proceeded to inventory the contents of the vehicle as was required by
departmental policy. During this process, the police discovered beer and liquor in the
trunk of the automobile. Thereupon, the defendant was additionally charged with
illegally transporting alcoholic beverages for purposes of sale in a dry county. Ken-
tucky's highest court, then the Court of Appeals, held that the practice of routinely
impounding and searching a vehicle subsequent to an arrest "is of questionable legal-
ity." Id. at 691.
93 428 U.S. at 384-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 385.
91 Id. at 387 (quoting from Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461
(1971)).
96 Id. at 388 n.6.
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was not in any way precipitated by safety concerns. Indeed,
the evidence indicated that the inventory was undertaken for
the sole purpose of securing valuables.97 Moreover, Justice
Marshall asserted that routine searches based upon an "undif-
ferentiated possibility of harm,"98 cannot be rationalized by a
"blanket safety argument."99 Rather, "specific circumstances
indicating the possibilty of a particular danger,"'100 must exist
to justify such an intrusion. Likewise, the second justification
relating to the potential liability faced by police for lost prop-
erty claims, was rendered meaningless as to the particular
facts since South Dakota law classified police as "gratuitous
depositors." As such they have only minimal duties with re-
gard to conducting an inventory and consequently are subject
to liability in only limited situations.1' 1 The final justification
advanced by the Court involved the protection of valuables
located inside a closed compartment of an impounded vehicle.
However, because this would require an inventory search as a
matter of routine, rather than a matter of consent, it exceeds
fourth amendment perimeters.
10 2
The notion of routine inventory searches presupposes
that "everyone whose car is impounded would want it to be
searched.'0 3 Such an approach, contended Justice Marshall,
"is squarely contrary to the law of consent."'' 0 He argued that
a search may be conducted without consent only if two re-
quirements are fulfilled:
First, there must be specific cause to believe that a search of
the scope to be undertaken is necessary in order to preserve
the integrity of particular valuable property threatened by
the impoundment. Second, even where a search might be
appropriate, such an intrusion may only follow the exhaus-
tion and failure of reasonable efforts under the circum-
stances to identify and reach the owner of the property in
7 Id. at 389.
" Id. at 390.
" Id. at 389.
100 Id. at 390-91.
101 Id. at 391.
102 Id. at 392.
103 Id.
10" Id. at 393.
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order to facilitate alternate means of security or to obtain
his consent to the search. 05
The police in Opperman, although having readily determined
ownership of the impounded vehicle "made no effort to secure
the owner's consent to search."106 Therefore, Justice Marshall
concluded that the search violated "privacy and security in-
terests protected by the Fourth Amendment."
10 7
2. Wagner v. Commonwealth: Rejection of the Opperman
Rationale
Justice Marshall suggested at the close of his Opperman
dissent that "this Court's holding does not preclude a con-
trary resolution of this case or others involving the same is-
sues under any applicable state law."10 Indeed, the South Da-
kota Supreme Court, when considering the Opperman case on
remand from the United States Supreme Court, interpreted
its state constitution 0 " as prohibiting routine inventory
searches.110 Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Wag-
ner v. Commonwealth,"' considered the legality of inventory
searches for the first time since the Opperman opinion was
rendered,112 and in so doing rested its decision solely on sec-
105 Id. at 393-94.
,06 Id. at 395.
107 Id. at 395-96.
008 Id. at 396. Opperman dissenter Justice Brennan also has encouraged state
courts to employ state constitutional standards. See Brennan, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). For additional
information regarding a state court's option in this regard, see NowAK, ROTUNDA, &
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20-22 (1977).
109 Article VI, § II of the South Dakota Constitution is that jurisdiction's consti-
tutional equivalent of the fourth amendment.
"o State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976).
m 582 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1979).
112 However, the Kentucky Court of Appeals had earlier confronted this precise
issue in Ewen v. Commonwealth, 26 Ky. L. Summ. 1, 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as KLS]. The facts in Ewen are similar to those of City of Danville v. Daw-
son, 528 S.W,2d 687 (Ky. 1975), in that the vehicle was stopped because of traffic
infractions and the driver and occupant were subsequently arrested for reckless driv-
ing and public intoxication. After learning via police radio that neither of the ar-
restees was the owner of the automobile, the officer impounded it and initiated an
inventory search pursuant to standard police procedure. Upon opening the automo-
bile's locked trunk, the officer discovered several bags of marijuana and a quantity of
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tion 10 of the Kentucky Constitution.11
In Wagner, upon responding to a reported disturbance at
a nearby store, the police encountered a woman accusing a
man of raping her and detaining her against her will. Prior to
taking the defendant to the police station for questioning, the
police permitted him to "lock his car and secure it. ' '11 4 As this
was being done, the alleged victim pointed out blood on the
upholstery which she claimed was hers. Thereafter, Wagner
was taken to the station, questioned, and ultimately charged
with assault and rape. Subsequent to his formal arrest, a war-
rantless "inventory" search of Wagner's automobile, which
had in the meantime been towed to the station, was con-
ducted by the police for the purpose of "looking for evi-
dence." 1 5 Assuming a position strikingly similar to that
adopted by Justice Marshall in his Opperman dissent, the
Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the evidence should have
been suppressed because it was the product of an illegal
search. 6
In reaching its decision, the Court enunciated some de-
tailed guidelines for the impoundment of a vehicle. The Court
noted that the warrantless impoundment of a vehicle can only
occur if:
pills in a basket of clothes. In upholding the search, the court of appeals noted the
irreconcilable conflict between the Opperman and Dawson results. The court rea-
soned that Opperman superceded Dawson in that the Kentucky case was decided
prior to Opperman and exclusively upon federal constitutional grounds. Obviously
troubled by the result mandated by Opperman, the court of appeals stated in its
opinion:
The various states may demand more strict standards under their own con-
stitutional provision than the Fourth Amendment requires, although they
may not apply less stringent standards. If Kentucky wishes to declare more
stringent controls under Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution ... then
it is the sole prerogative of the Kentucky Supreme Court, not the Court of
Appeals to do so.
26 KLS at 5.
113 Ky. CONST. § 10 provides that:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions,
from unreasonable search and seizure; and no warrant shall issue to search
any place, or seize any person or thing, without describing them as nearly
as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
11 Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Ky. 1979).
115 Id.
"' Id. at 357.
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1. The owner or permissive user consents to the
impoundment;
2. The vehicle, if not removed, constitutes a danger to
other persons or property or the public safety and the owner
or permissive user cannot reasonably arrange for alternate
means of removal;
3. The police have probable cause to believe both that the
vehicle constitutes an instrumentality or fruit of a crime and
that absent immediate impoundment the vehicle will be re-
moved by a third party; or
4. The police have probable cause to believe both that the
vehicle contains evidence of a crime and that absent imme-
diate impoundment the evidence will be lost or destroyed.
17
The Wagner Court explained that "[o]nly when the vehicle if
not removed poses a danger to other persons, property or the
public safety does there exist a public interest to justify im-
poundment"118 withotit the consent of the owner.
In examining the legality of a routine police inventory di-
rected at a lawfully impounded vehicle, the Wagner Court
stated at the outset that "[m]ere legal custody of an automo-
bile by law enforcement officials does not automatically create
a right to rummage about its interior."119 Moreover, the Court
declared the inventory search to be "an invasion additional to
the intrusion upon [any owner's] privacy interests occasioned
by the impoundment itself. ' 120 As a "substantial invasion of
the [owner's] zone of privacy,"1 21 an inventory search is pro-
hibited unless consent is given or "substantial necessities
grounded upon public safety justify" it. 122 On the other hand,
the giving of consent by an owner triggers a concomitant right
to have a representative present during the inventory and "to
limit [it] to only specific portions of the vehicle.' 23 Further-
more, absent consent, a warrant must be obtained in order to
conduct a search of the automobile if the officers "have proba-
"I Id. at 356.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 357.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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ble cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence or con-
stitutes a fruit or instrumentality of a crime."12'
Employing this two-pronged analytical scheme, the Su-
preme Court found the "inventory" search in Wagner to be
constitutionally offensive "even though the car had been law-
fully impounded. 12 5 In concluding that the search was illegal,
the Court expressly noted that it had been conducted without
Wagner's consent and without a warrant.1 26 Presumably, the
Court felt that no "substantial necessities" existed.
3. Evaluating the Arguments
a. Impoundment Guidelines
In Opperman, the United States Supreme Court unequiv-
ocally stated that the impoundment power of the police is
"beyond challenge11 27 in situations where "the public safety
and [or] the efficient movement of vehicular traffic"1 28 is jeop-
ardized. Likewise, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Wagner
indicated that if an illegally parked vehicle, for example,
posed a threat to public safety, then it could be impounded
without a warrant, assuming, of course, that the owner could
not make alternate arrangements for its removal. 29
The Supreme Court in Opperman purportedly dealt only
with impoundments undertaken for caretaking purposes, that
is, seizures conducted for non-investigatory reasons.130 By
contrast, the Kentucky Supreme Court set forth guidelines
governing both non-investigatory and investigatory impound-
ments. When an impoundment is undertaken for investigatory
purposes, the Court stated that both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances must exist. The exigencies are supplied by
a reasonable belief on the part of the police that evidence will
be lost or destroyed absent immediate ieizure.131 However, the
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
117 428 U.S. at 369.
128 Id.
129 581 S.W.2d at 356.
121 428 U.S. at 368-69.
131 See text accompanying note 117 supra for the exact language used by the
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"automobile" exception to the warrant requirement as cur-
rently recognized by a majority of the United States Supreme
Court'32 permits a warrantless search or seizure solely upon a
finding of probable cause to believe that a car contains evi-
dence of a crime or was an instrumentality involved in a
crime. No exigent circumstances need be found to justify the
failure to obtain a warrant; it suffices that the object seized or
searched is an automobile. 133 Thus, the Wagner approach, by
Wagner Court.
131 Chief Justice Burger, Associate Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Stewart, and White.
133 To better understand the auto exception it is essential to consider its evolu-
tion in United States Supreme Court opinions. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1971), federal agents stopped a car they believed was being used to transport
illegally imported liquor. The agents searched the car, found whiskey and gin inside
the seats, and arrested the occupants. The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless
stop, search, and seizure, feeling that the crucial fourth amendment issue raised by
Carroll was the seizure of the persons of the occupants when the car was stopped,
thus no separate justification was needed for the search of the automobile. The stop
of the automobile was based on probable cause, as it would have been impossible to
obtain a warrant prior to the stop because the automobile was moving.
In Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), again involving a violation of the
National Prohibition Act, the Court approved a warrantless search of an automobile
despite the fact that there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant, because "[the
officers] could not know when Husty would come to the car or how soon it would be
removed." Id. at 701. The Court reasoned: "we do not think the officers should be
required to speculate upon the chances of successfully carrying out the search, after
the delay and withdrawal from the scene of one or more officers which would have
been necessary to procure a warrant." Id. Thus, up to this point, two general excep-
tions to the warrant requirement as it applied to vehicles had been carved out. In
Carroll it was impossible to procure a warrant while in Husty it was not practical to
require the officers to leave the scene in order to procure a warrant.
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), on the other hand, the automobile
was in custody at the police station at the time of the warrantless search. The police
had probable cause to believe that two robbers were fleeing a robbery they had just
committed and were in possession of stolen goods. The officers stopped the car, ar-
rested the occupants, and drove the car to the police station where they conducted a
thorough search without benefit of warrant. In a compartment under the dashboard
the officers found guns, loot and other evidence.
Justice White authored the Court's opinion, with only Justice Harlan dissenting.
The Court held: (1) the impoundment of the car for purposes of search was not un-
reasonable because the arrest had occurred in the middle of the night in a dark park-
ing lot where a thorough search would be difficult and dangerous; (2) since the police
could conduct a warrantless search at the scene on the basis of Carroll they could also
search without a warrant at the station house. In White's view the occupants' right of
privacy in the contents of the car would not be enhanced by requiring the officers to
obtain a warrant after immobilization or impoundment. Id. at 51.
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requiring the existence of probable cause and exigent circum-
One may take issue with Justice White's facile assumption that Carroll would
have allowed a warrantless search at the scene. In Carroll the search preceded the
arrest while in Chambers the defendants were arrested and in custody before any
search took place. It has been pointed out, however, that to allow a warrantless search
preceding arrest and to forbid it after arrest would create an unenforceable distinc-
tion and would encourage police to delay arrest in order to first make a warrantless
search. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 835, 844 (1974). Chambers, in effect, created the automobile exception to the
warrant clause, an exception initially based on the inherent mobility of cars, but not
requiring any probability in fact that a particular car might be moved.
However, in the term following Chambers, the Court struck down the warrantless
seizure of a car from private property and the subsequent search of that car at the
station. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), Stewart wrote in the
plurality opinion that there had to be some real possibility of the car being moved for
Carroll to apply. Since this real possibility was not present, the warrantless search
was held invalid. Brennan, Marshall and Douglas joined Stewart, indicating that their
majority votes in Chambers had been a mistake. Harlan, who had dissented in Cham-
bers, and therefore should have voted with Stewart on this issue, wrote a concurring
opinion in which he did not join that part of Stewart's opinion dealing with the war-
rantless search of the car. Id. at 460-62. White, joined in dissent by Burger, Black-
mun, and Black argued for the automobile exception he had developed in Chambers.
Id. at 510.
Subsequent cases and changes in the Court have, sub silentio, overruled Coo-
lidge. Of the five members who voted to reverse in Coolidge, three Justices: Stewart,
Marshall and Brennan, remain on the Court today. Harlan and Douglas, the other
two members voting for reversal, were replaced by Rehnquist and Stevens. Rehnquist
and Stevens subscribe to the automobile exception. Of the four who voted to affirm in
Coolidge, three: White, Burger and Blackmun, also believe in the automobile excep-
tion. The replacement of Black by Powell effects no change. Thus the current status
is six to three in favor of the automobile exception.
In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the police impounded a wrecked
automobile and towed it to a service station. Later they received information giving
them cause to believe that there was a gun in the car. The driver at this point was in
a local hospital in a coma. The police searched the car without a warrant and found
evidence of a homicide for which the driver was later convicted. The Supreme Court
upheld in a five to four vote the warrantless search. (Burger, Blackmun, White, Pow-
ell and Rehnquist for the majority; Stewart, Marshall, Douglas and Brennan in dis-
sent). Rehnquist, writing for the Court, referred to the Court's prior recognition of
the distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling places, id. at 447-48, and noted
that it would be unwise to require police to guard a vehicle while seeking a warrant.
Further confirmation that there was an automobile exception came the next year
in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). In Cardwell, the police had probable cause
to believe that Lewis had committed murder and had used his car to push the vic-
tim's car over an embankment. An arrest warrant was obtained. Lewis, in response to
a request from the District Attorney, voluntarily drove the car in question to the
Office of the Division of Criminal Activities in Columbus, Ohio, and parked in a pub-
lic lot. Although the police had been in possession of an arrest warrant all day, Lewis
was not arrested until late afternoon. Subsequently, the police impounded the car
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stances as a prerequisite to a warrantless investigatory im-
and took paint scrapings and tire impressions, which were matched with evidence
from the scene of the crime. Id. at 588. The Supreme Court, again by a five to four
vote upheld the warrantless seizure and search. Clearly no exigent circumstances were
present.
The impoundment in Chambers had been justified by reference to dangerous and
difficult conditions involved with an on-the-scene search. 399 U.S. at 51. A reasonable
implication of Chambers was that, absent such conditions, the officers would be re-
quired to search at the scene of the stop (as in Carroll) and release the car if no
evidence was discovered. The Court rejected this reading of Chambers in Texas v.
White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975), decided the term after Cardwell. Based on probable cause,
the officers stopped a car in broad daylight and arrested' the driver for a non-violent
crime. There was no reason the car could not have been searched at the site of the
stop. Nevertheless, the officers impounded it and conducted a search at the station.
The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam with only Marshall and Brennan dissenting.
Thus officers were given the option of searching at the scene or impounding and
searching at the station. No exigent circumstances were required for the second
course of action.
In Opperman, Justice Burger articulated the rationale for the automobile excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, not in terms of the inherent mobility of automobiles
which in some instances would make obtaining a warrant impossible, difficult or dan-
gerous, 428 U.S. at 267, but rather in terms of a limited expectation of privacy by the
occupants. Id. at 368. He felt that three factors diminished one's expectation of pri-
vacy in the contents of a car: 1) periodic police inspection; 2) the public nature of
automobile travel; and 3) the unquestioned authority of the police to impound dis-
abled or illegally parked cars. Id. Whether the average driver does in fact have an
expectation of privacy in his car significantly less than in his home is unimportant;
Burger found there to be a diminished expectation of privacy as a matter of legisla-
tive fact-finding. There is no appeal from that finding.
In two recent cases, a majority of the Court has referred openly to the automo-
bile exception to the warrant requirement. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977), the Court refused to extend this exception to other moveables, specifically a
footlocker which federal agents had probable cause to believe contained marijuana.
Burger, for the majority, again engaged in legislative fact-finding and found an expec-
tation of privacy in personal luggage to be substantially greater than a person's ex-
pectation of privacy in an automobile. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979),
the issue was whether the warrantless search of an unlocked suitcase in the trunk of a
car fell on the Chadwick or Chambers/Carroll side of the fourth amendment line. Id.
at 757. Powell, writing for the majority, found the suitcase to be like the trunk in
Chadwick, thus invalidating the search. Although he acknowledged the "automobile
exception," the term was in quotation marks indicating, perhaps, an uneasiness with
it. Id. Burger concurred in an opinion which, like Powell's, acknowledged the automo-
bile exception with quotation marks. Id. at 767. Blackmun dissented in an opinion
which omitted the quotation marks, indicating a belief that the automobile exception
was so firmly established as not to require explanation or qualification. Id. at 768.
In Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978), decided the same term as Sanders, the
Court held five to four that a passenger did not have standing to contest the search of
the glove compartment of the car in which he was riding. Powell and Burger con-
curred, thus creating the majority in an opinion resting squarely on the judicially-
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poundment, implicitly rejects the "automobile" exception.
b. Inventory Guidelines
The utility of the Wagner guidelines regarding inventory
searches can best be ascertained by evaluating the three afore-
mentioned objectives upon which the Opperman Court rested
its approval of the inventory process on a routine basis. It is
also important to keep in mind Justice Marshall's critique of
these objectives, for the Wagner opinion adopts the same ra-
tionale. One of the stated objectives of inventory is to provide
protection to items of property left in an impounded vehicle
during an owner's absence.1 34 If an inventory is in fact under-
taken for the benefit of the owner, it logically follows that his
wishes ought to be determinative of whether such a "protec-
tive" search even should be conducted. The Opperman deci-
sion implicitly rejected this notion by legitimizing routinely
conducted inventory searches.13 5 Such a ruling presupposes
that an owner's consent is not a salient consideration in deter-
mining the validity of a search conducted ostensibly for his
benefit. This inconsistency has subjected the Opperman ratio-
nale to intense criticism. 136
found decreased expectation of privacy in automobiles.
It bears repeating: a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States will not
require a warrant to seize or search an automobile when probable cause exists. No
exigent circumstances need be found to justify the failure to obtain a warrant. It
suffices that the object seized or searched is an automobile.
"' South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
' ' Of course, the owner was not in fact present in Opperman but the police had
ascertained ownership of the vehicle without thereafter making any effort to contact
that owner. See notes 87-92 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the re-
quirement that police make reasonable efforts to contact the owner.
"3O See note 87 supra for a list of commentators who have assumed a critical
posture with regard to this aspect of the Opperman decision. The most immediate
criticism, of course, came from Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion wherein he
stated: "It is at least clear that any owner might prohibit the police from executing a
protective search of his impounded car, since by hypothesis the inventory is con-
ducted for the owner's benefit." 428 U.S. at 392 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
This inconsistency is accentuated by the fact that in order to "protect" valuables
in an unattended automobile, police often have to break into the car. This was the
situation in both Wagner and Opperman. Brief for Respondent at 2, South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In this regard, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973), has commented:
[I]t is hard to see, when the car was locked and the windows rolled up at
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On the other hand, the position assumed by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court in Wagner reflects a common sense ap-
proach to inventory searches in that the undertaking of such a
search is conditioned upon an owner's consent. The Wagner
Court was clear to state that the owner can make whatever
arrangements he deems necessary to protect his property if he
refuses to consent to an inventory search of his vehicle.
137
To the extent that the Wagner ruling is premised upon
the notion that an owner is better situated than the local po-
lice department to decide what is in his best proprietary inter-
est, it essentially places control over the inventory process
with the owner and consequently makes available to him a de-
vice by which to protect his unattended property. While the
inventory process as structured in Opperman may serve to
benefit the owner in some instances, in others it may work to
his detriment. More specifically, in those instances in which
the owner does not desire the protection allegedly afforded by
an inventory, 3 8 such a routine search merely serves to arm
the police with a ploy for searching a vehicle without a war-
the time it was impounded, how the property is better safeguarded by
breaking into the car and locked trunk to inventory. In many cases, the
value of the property "safeguarded" by these actions would be less than the
damage caused to the automobile by these "protective" measures.
Id. at 477.
137 The Florida Court of Appeals, in Altman v. State, 335 So.2d 626 (Fla. App.
1976), listed two options that may be available to a driver faced with the possible
impoundment of his automobile:
When a driver of a motor vehicle is arrested and a reliable friend is present,
authorized, and capable to remove an owner's vehicle which is capable of
being safely removed; or when the arrestee expresses a preference as to tow-
ing service and designates an appropriate carrier and designation for the
vehicle, it is unnecessary for the police to impound it. In either of these
circumstances, the rationale for an inventory search does not exist.
Id. at 629. See also, State v. Grant, 357 So.2d 513 (La. 1978); Drinkard v. State, 584
S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. 1979); State v. Bales, 552 P.2d 688 (Wash. App. 1976).
138 Justice Marshall pointed out in his Opperman dissent that the Supreme
Court's legitimization of routinely conducted inventory searches is grounded upon
the assumption that all owners of impounded vehicles would prefer to have any prop-
erty therein protected in this fashion. As support for his contention that such an
assumption is unwarranted, Justice Marshall had to look no further than the facts of
Opperman for the defendant certainly did not desire an inventory. However, he ad-
ded, "one need not carry contraband to prefer that the police not examine one's pri-
vate possessions. Indeed, that preference is the premise of the Fourth Amendment."
428 U.S. at 392-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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rant. ' 9 In this regard, the guidelines set forth in Wagner are
more closely tailored to meeting the specified objective of pro-
tecting an absent owner's property than an inventory process
undertaken routinely."1 0
In some circumstances, however, the owner or permissive
user will not be present to consent to the inventory search or
otherwise make arrangements for safeguarding the automo-
bile's contents."" In such a situation, the Wagner Court indi-
cated that an inventory search could normally be conducted
without a warrant only if "substantial necessities grounded
upon public safety" exist. However, the Court expressly re-
served the issue of when such a need would be deemed to ex-
ist,14 2 but in so doing stated:
A determination of the circumstances which would justify an
inventory of a lawfully impounded vehicle whose owner or
permissive user is not present or whose owner or permissive
139 See, e.g., Pigford v. United States, 273 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1971); State v. Gwinn,
301 A.2d 291, 293-94 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Gonzales v. State, 507 P.2d 1277, 1287
(Okla. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Keller, 510 P.2d 568, 570 (Or. 1973). For a discus-
sion of the inventory process as a subterfuge for undermining fourth amendment
rights, see Baker & Khourie, Improbable Cause-The Poisonous Fruits of a Search
after Arrest for a Traffic Violation, 25 OKLA. L. REv. 54, 63-73 (1972).
Perhaps the most accessible counter-argument for the contention that the inven-
tory process is employed as a mere pretext for warrantlessly discovering evidence, is
that law enforcement officials simply do not have the time and/or resources to con-
duct exploratory searches of impounded automobiles under the auspices of an inven-
tory. This thinking presumes protection by extrajudicial sources of restraint from in-
fringement. That the Supreme Court has continually rejected this notion is
illustrated by the Court's incessant demand for adherence to the warrant require-
ment. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967).
10 Other courts have likewise questioned why this objective could not be effectu-
ated by less intrusive means. In Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1971),
the California Supreme Court noted:
[I]tems of value left in an automobile to be stored by the police may be
adequately protected merely by rolling up the windows, locking the vehicle
doors and returning the keys to the owner. The owner himself, if required
to leave his car temporarily, could do no more to protect his property.
Id. at 88-89.
"4 This will typically be the case, for example, in the nonmoving traffic violation
context illustrated by Opperman. See text accompanying notes 81-85 supra for a
brief description of the factual setting of Opperman.
"2 See text accompanying notes 104-07 supra for Marshall's viewpoint as to
when a need to override the absence of consent exists.
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user may not be reasonably contacted at the time of im-
poundment is a matter which we reserve until we are
presented with a case which squarely presents this issue.143
This much is clearly implied by the Wagner Court: "substan-
tial necessities" would not exist if it is feasible for police to
ascertain ownership of a vehicle and contact the owner.'"
Again, in such a situation, the owner's wishes regarding the
contents of an automobile would be determinative. By requir-
ing police to make reasonable efforts to reach the owner,14 5
the Wagner Court has attempted to solidify an owner's con-
trol over the inventory process.
The inventory process, as structured in Opperman, has
been criticized as inherently deficient in protecting police
from false claims of theft. The most immediate criticism, of
course, came from Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion
wherein he pointed out "that any owner might prohibit the
police from executing a protective search of his impounded
car, since by hypothesis the inventory is conducted for the
owner's benefit."'14 6 Law enforcement officials cannot reasona-
bly expect to be shielded from such claims by an inventory
procedure that imposes no checks on them to ensure that all
items are inventoried. Accordingly, the Court in Wagner rec-
ognized an owner's right to have a representative present dur-
ing any authorized inventory.14 7 This bolstering of the inven-
tory process serves to benefit both the police and the property
143 Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352, 357 (Ky. 1979).
144 See note 105 supra and accompanying text for Marshall's discussion of this
point. If a vehicle is registered in the state where it is stepped, then ascertaining
ownership is easily done as the facts of Ewen v. Commonwealth, 26 KLS 1, 4 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1979), illustrate. See note 112 supra for a description of Ewen.
145 This "duty" may have been precipitated by a statement of Kentucky's high-
est court in the pre-Opperman case of City of Danville v. Dawson, 528 S.W.2d 687
(Ky. 1975). Therein, that Court remarked: "We do not say that police officers must
find a custodian for an automobile on a public street after arresting its driver, but
ordinarily it should be just as easy to reach some person at his home as it is to call for
a wrecker." Id. at 690.
148 428 U.S. at 392 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
247 This is not a completely novel idea; in Wright v. State, 236 So.2d 408, 412
(Miss. 1970), the Supreme Court of Mississippi noted the practice of inventorying the
personal belongings of a prisoner in the presence of a witness so as to discourage any
subsequent false claims of theft.
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owner.
14
8
A corresponding benefit of the Wagner approach is that
potential police liability extends only as far as the owner al-
lows the inventory search to proceed. If an owner does not
consent to an inventory search, he will be deemed to have as-
sumed the risk that items within the confines of his automo-
bile may be lost or stolen.149 Likewise, if the owner's consent
runs to only specifically designated areas of the vehicle, then
police could not be held liable for articles missing from those
areas not authorized to be inventoried. Under this scheme po-
lice are provided better protection against false claims of theft
than that afforded by a routine inventory process in that the
number of situations in which unfounded claims may arise is
lessened.
With regard to the third objective of the inventory pro-
cess, ensuring police safety,150 the Wagner Court was less than
explicit. Its guidelines for impoundment and inventory con-
template the possibility of an unsearched automobile being
within police possession and hence instances may arise when
police safety is jeopardized thereby.15' Common sense dictates
that during such times of emergency an immediate warrant-
less search be allowed. Arguably, the aforementioned "sub-
148 See Comment, Police Inventories of the Contents of Vehicles and the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 29 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 197, 204-06 (1972). Justice Marshall suggested
that these two objectives might better be effectuated by "sealing the doors and trunk
of the car so that an unbroken seal would certify that the car had not been opened
during custody." 428 U.S. at 391 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149 581 S.W.2d at 357. In such a situation, the police are required to "merely lock
up the vehicle and leave it in place until the owner or permissive user makes suitable
arrangements for its removal." Id. This approach is reflective of the attitude exhib-
ited by Kentucky's highest court in the pre-Opperman case of City of Danville v.
Dawson, 528 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1975) wherein it was stated:
[U]nless it is necessary for the police to impound a vehicle they are no more
responsible for its security than they are for the security of the home from
which the owner's arrest causes him to remain absent. If it is locked and
the keys are given back to him ... it is no fault of the police that the car
must remain unguarded until he is able to make arrangements for its
removal.
Id. at 690.
11o 428 U.S. at 369.
'5 Although Justice Marshall acquiesced in Justice Powell's contention that
such instances are "rare," he nevertheless stopped short of dismissing this possibility
as a justification for an inventory search. 428 U.S. at 390 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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stantial necessity" exception is sufficiently broad to encom-
pass a search undertaken in such exigent circumstances.e 2
The validity of any search conducted in such a context, pre-
sumably, would turn on whether the police can "point to spe-
cific and articulable facts which.., reasonably warrant that
intrusion. '" 153
While the justifications for inventory searches as enunci-
ated by the Opperman Court are generally considered to be
laudible objectives, the decision therein to legitimize routine
warrantless searches does not effectively realize these ends.
The guidelines expounded by Kentucky's highest court, on
the other hand, reflect a recognition of the realities involved
in the inventory search context and represent an attempt to
avoid the inconsistencies that pervade the Opperman ratio-
nale. Moreover, unlike Opperman, the Wagner approach
serves to achieve the stated objectives of the inventory
process.
C. Wagner in Operation
Assume that the police have probable cause to suspect
that the occupants of a particular automobile have committed
a criminal offense and are fleeing the scene of the crime with
fruits thereof. Further assume that the police stop the depart-
ing vehicle, arrest its occupants and take them to the station.
At this point, what would the arresting officers be authorized
to do under Wagner in terms of conducting a warrantless
seizure and/or search of the vehicle? To the extent that the
automobile poses no threat to public safety and its owner or
permissive user has withheld consent, the vehicle could be im-
pounded without a warrant only if exigent circumstances were
found to exist-that is, some real possibility that evidence
would be lost or destroyed if not immediately seized. Absent
such a possibility, Wagner requires that a warrant to impound
be obtained.
158 See notes 103-07 and 119-26 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the "substantial necessities" exception to the warrant requirement.
183 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
448 (1973).
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If the vehicle is properly impounded, either pursuant to a
warrant or one of the Wagner exceptions, the question be-
comes whether a warrantless search of the automobile can be
conducted at the site. Assuming that the owner or permissive
user has not rendered consent and that substantial necessities
are not present in this factual context,154 Wagner demands
that a search warrant be procured. 155 Faced with the possibil-
ity of having to post a guard at the vehicle while procuring
such a warrant, the police are likely to simply tow the auto-
mobile to the station and search it there. Of course, Wagner
requires that this search also be conducted pursuant to a
warrant.
The question arises as to whether Wagner would permit
police to forgo impoundment altogether and allow them to
simply search the vehicle on the spot without a warrant. Al-
though the Court did not directly consider this issue, the
structure of the opinion itself indicates that police would be
precluded from searching a vehicle without first having im-
pounded it. More specifically, the two-tiered approach set out
in Wagner with regard to impoundment and search strongly
suggests that the, former is a prerequisite to the latter.
The aforementioned fact pattern is essentially that of
Chambers v. Maroney,58 wherein the United States Supreme
Court ruled that as long as the officers acted with probable
cause, the automobile could be properly searched without a
warrant either at the site or subsequently at the police sta-
tion. 1 57 To the extent that Wagner precludes a warrantless
search in either instance, despite the existence of probable
cause, it is inconsistent with Chambers. This implicit rejection
of the automobile exception indicates that Kentucky's highest
court did not contemplate the far reaching ramifications that
1" Substantial necessities will not normally exist because the owner can be con-
tacted readily. See notes 88-93 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
"substantial necessities" exception to the warrant requirement.
115 581 S.W.2d at 357. The Wagner Court specifically stated: "[an inventory
search] is an invasion additional to the intrusion upon [an owner's] privacy interests
occasioned by the impoundment itself." Id.
1-6 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
157 See note 133 supra for a description of the Chambers approach to ascertain-
ing the validity of warrantless searches.
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the Wagner decision obviously entails.15 8 Nevertheless, the
basic thrust of the Wagner rationale with regard to inventory
searches-that is, to permit the owner's wishes to be determi-
native of whether such a "protective" search is conducted-is
unquestionably sound when examined in light of the pur-
ported objectives of the routine inventory process. For obvious
reasons, however, this approach is inherently inadequate when
applied in an investigatory context.
III. INVESTIGATORY AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Wagner pre-
sumably affects the validity of the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals' earlier but recent ruling in Cooper v. Commonwealth'0
regarding the warrantless investigatory search of an automo-
bile. In Cooper, after having stopped a speeding automobile
and confronting its driver, a state trooper smelled marijuana
smoke and consequently decided to search the vehicle. At that
point, Cooper, the sole occupant of the car, opened the ash-
tray revealing a small quantity of marijuana and urged the
officer not to "bust a man for having a few roaches."''10 The
trooper then ordered Cooper out of the car, arrested him, and
placed him in the police cruiser. Returning to the arrestee's
automobile, the officer seized the contents of the ashtray and
I" Arguably, the Kentucky Supreme Court did perceive the consequences of
Wagner for in Gallman v. Commonwealth, 578 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1979), it stated em-
phatically that both probable cause and exigent circumstances were necessary if a
warrantless automobile search was to be upheld. Although the warrantless search of a
car was indeed involved in Gallman, the Kentucky Supreme Court found no exigent
circumstances to be present. Presumably, the Court required exigent circumstances
in fact. Thus, Gallman, like Wagner, refused to recognize a general automobile ex-
ception in which the exigencies are supplied by the mere fact that an automobile is
implicated. Such a course of action by the Court would be permissible in light of
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975), which allows state courts to interpret their
respective constitutions in a more expansive manner with regard to individual rights
than that reflected by the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the fed-
eral Constitution. See note 108 supra and accompanying text for further discussion of
this proposition. However, there has been no explicit statement by the Kentucky Su-
preme Court as of yet indicating that this course of action has indeed been by design.
259 577 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). The Cooper decision predated the Wag-
ner decision by some four months with the former opinion being rendered in January
of 1979 and the latter in May of 1979.
16o Id. at 35.
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searched the surrounding floor space including the area be-
neath the seats. Therein, he found more marijuana and a
small electric razor case that had been sealed with heavy ad-
hesive tape. The case was opened, and a "white substance
which later provided [sic] to be cocaine" 1e6 was observed. A
narcotics agent who had been called to the scene of the stop
by the trooper was then shown the contraband and sent to
procure a search warrant for the remaining areas of the auto-
mobile. After the car had been towed to a nearby private ga-
rage, the agent executed the search warrant and in so doing
discovered even more marijuana in a false panel of the car's
dashboard.162
Cooper subsequently challenged the validity of the war-
rantless search, asserting that it was "unreasonable and illegal
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion. ' 163 Specifically, he contended that there were no exigent
circumstances by which to justify the warrantless automobile
search. In support of this argument, he noted that the police
had been in complete control of the car since his arrest and
that a warrant was obtained to complete the search at the ga-
rage.1 6 4 Like the Supreme Court in Wagner, the Cooper court
rejected the notion of a general automobile exception to the
fourth amendment, but did so expressly. It declared that the
warrantless search of a vehicle cannot be justified solely on
the basis of probable cause; rather, both probable cause and
exigent circumstances are required if such a search is to be
upheld."6 5 Finding both of these essential elements to be pre-
sent, the Court of Appeals rejected Cooper's argument and
161 Id.
M62 Id.
163 Id. at 37. See notes 9 and 113 supra for the language of the fourth amend-
ment and section 10.
114 Id. at 37-38.
165 Id. at 37. As support for this principle the Cooper Court cited the United
States Supreme Court cases of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) and
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See note 113 supra for the proposition
that Coolidge is no longer controlling law and for the proposition that Chambers may
permit a warrantless automobile search based on probable cause absent exigent cir-
cumstances in fact.
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validated the warrantless search. The court noted that had
the trooper attempted to obtain a warrant before conducting a
search of the car, "Cooper could have fled the scene and dis-
posed of the cocaine and marijuana.""1 ' Thus, "[t]he trooper
was faced with a 'now or never' situation that justified an im-
mediate warrantless search. '167 Moreover, the court cited
Chambers for the proposition that an officer in these circum-
stances is "not required to suspend continuation of his search
until a warrant [can] be obtained." 6 "
Upon applying the Wagner rationale retrospectively to
the facts of Cooper, it is apparent that the decision reached
by the court of appeals in Cooper is suspect. In Cooper, the
defendant's argument with respect to an absence of exigent
circumstances is unassailable when considered in light of
Wagner. How the marijuana and cocaine could have been de-
stroyed or lost when the car in which they were located "was
under police guard at all times"1 19 is an enigmatic proposition.
Furthermore, Cooper properly relied upon the decision in
United States v. Chadwick' ° in asserting that there were no
exigent circumstances calling for the immediate warrantless
search of the sealed razor case. In Chadwick, federal officers
had probable cause to believe that a locked footlocker con-
tained contraband and as such seized it as it was being placed
in the trunk of an automobile. The footlocker was taken by
the agents to another location where a warrantless search re-
vealed a large quantity of marijuana. As noted by the Cooper
court, "[tihe sole question before the Supreme Court was
whether the government had a right to search the contents of
the locked footlocker without a search warrant [and] based
solely upon probable cause. '1 7 1 The Supreme Court responded
in the negative and held the warrantless search to be invalid
166 Id. at 38.
167 Id.
168 Id. See notes 131-33 and accompanying text for the proposition that Wagner
implicitly rejects Chambers.
169 Id. at 36.
170 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See note 133 supra for discussion of Chadwick as it relates
to the Supreme Court's current attitude toward an automobile exception to the
fourth amendment.
171 Cooper v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 34, 38-39 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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for lack of exigent circumstances. The Court placed particular
emphasis on the fact that the footlocker had been in the ex-
clusive dominion of the agents from the time of its seizure.
This same reasoning should have applied with equal force to
the razor case in Cooper.
17 2
The Wagner guidelines clearly indicate that not only was
the warrantless search of the automobile improper, the war-
rantless search of the razor case was illegal as well. The Wag-
ner perimeters were exceeded in that no exigent circum-
stances in fact existed at the time of the intrusion.
Essentially, what happened in Cooper can no longer validly
occur under Wagner.
172 In all fairness to the court of appeals, at the time of its decision in Cooper
there was some question as to the effect of Chadwick upon the scope of a warrantless
automobile search as articulated in Chambers. To some extent this confusion has
been eliminated by Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), in which the Supreme
Court invalidated a warrantless search directed at a closed suitcase within an auto-
mobile trunk.
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